BANGALORE - A recent split in the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) (NSCN-K), one of the most powerful insurgent groups operating in India's conflict-ridden northeast, has injected uncertainty into an already complex ongoing Naga peace process. But it has the potential of putting in place an inclusive peace.
Less than a fortnight ago, the NSCN-K's hardline founder-chief, the Myanmar-based S S Khaplang, was expelled by his India-based commander-in-chief Khole Konyak on charges of acting in a "unilateral and dictatorial manner". Khaplang is reported to have removed Khole from his post, prompting the latter to have him "impeached" by the "national assembly" of the outfit's
underground "government".
Khaplang's ouster has resulted in a vertical split in the NSCN-K between the outfit's India-based leaders and cadres and those operating from Myanmar. Coming close on the heels of a rift between the United Liberation Front of Assam's (ULFA's) Myanmar-based military chief Paresh Barua and its pro-talks leaders based in Assam in India, the tensions in the NSCN-K between its India and Myanmar-based leaders is being quietly welcomed in New Delhi.
Khaplang, a Hemi Naga from Myanmar's Sagaing Division (Naga nationalists consider Sagaing to be Eastern Nagaland), is a benefactor of several anti-India insurgent groups such as Barua's faction of the ULFA and the Manipur-based United National Liberation Front (UNLF), having allowed their cadres to train in his camps. If these groups continue to draw on Khaplang's support in Myanmar, they will not be able to count on cooperating with Khole's men in India. The impact of the NSCN-K's split will therefore be felt across the region on other insurgent groups and their equations.
The Naga insurgency is India's longest running insurgency, dating back to 1946. On August 14, 1947, the eve of Indian independence from colonial rule, the Naga National Council (NNC) declared its independence. Subsequently, the movement went underground and armed struggle against the Indian security forces followed. In 1975, the NNC leadership signed the Shillong Accord with the Indian government and accepted the Indian constitution "without conditions".
Rebelling against this "sellout of the Naga cause", Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu and Khaplang left the NNC to form the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. Eight years later, the NSCN was plunged in internal bloodletting that culminated in Isak and Muivah forming the NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and Khaplang giving his name to the other faction, the NSCN-Khaplang.
In 1997, the Indian government and the NSCN-IM entered into a ceasefire agreement and have engaged in around 70 rounds of talks since. In 2001, the government entered into a ceasefire with NSCN-K too but it did not lead to initiation of a dialogue process.
The prospects of that happening appear to have brightened now.
Khole recently said that the "process would be expedited that would lead towards a peaceful resolution of the Naga political issue," the Morung Express, an English daily from Nagaland, reported. He has also expressed support for the ongoing reconciliation process among various Naga armed outfits.
Although the ceasefires with the Indian government have held over the past decade, Nagaland has been convulsed in violence with militant groups training their guns at each other. Much of this violence is driven by turf wars over the drug trade, extortion and other "businesses" that the insurgent groups are involved in.
Various tribal, civil society and church groups are working to reconcile the feuding Naga groups. It appears that Khaplang was opposed to any reconciliation with the NSCN-IM and forbade his India-based leaders from attending reconciliation meetings initiated by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation.
Reconciliation was an important issue driving the rift between the NSCN-K's Indian-based leaders and Khaplang. Khole and his supporters felt that Khaplang was out of touch with the ground situation in India.
"The mood among the Naga public is in favor of the insurgent groups uniting and engaging in talks with the Indian government," an insurgent-turned-social activist told Asia Times Online. "Unlike Khaplang, Khole saw the writing on the wall and is keen to respond to this sentiment," he says.
If Khole is indeed in favor of reconciliation with other Naga insurgent groups, the split in the NSCN-K could pave the way for his faction to move closer, if not, join hands with the NSCN-IM. Reconciliation could result in New Delhi having "to listen to a broader Naga voice," writes Wasbir Hussain, director of the Guwahati-based Center for Development & Peace Studies, and member of India's National Security Advisory Board.
As for the Khole faction's participation in talks with New Delhi, much will depend on how the NSCN-IM leadership will respond. Will they allow Khole into a process they have monopolized for 13 years? More importantly, will India risk disturbing the equilibrium it has managed to establish with the NSCN-IM?
Talks between the Indian government and the NSCN-IM have been criticized for their slow pace. Besides, it is not a transparent process. Little is known about what has transpired at the table; so thick is the shroud of secrecy under which India has conducted the negotiations with the NSCN-IM leadership. This has fed suspicion that a deal rather than a solution is in the pipeline.
The process has been a narrow and exclusive one with only the NSCN-IM at the high table. Other stakeholders like the NNC and the Naga HoHo have been kept out. Important tribes like the Angamis who support the NNC and the Konyaks who back the NSCN-K feel left out.
If a settlement has been slow in coming it is because of the huge gap in the positions of the two sides. While the NSCN-IM demands an independent homeland for the Nagas and lays claim to territory that includes not only the state of Nagaland but Naga-inhabited areas of neighboring states like Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh in India as well as Myanmar's Sagaing Division, India is firm that a solution must be within the framework of the Indian constitution. It is opposed to redrawing of state borders too as it will inflame an already restive region.
Despite the cynicism, there have been positive developments, pointing to softening positions. After years of travelling abroad under fake names and foreign passports, NSCN-IM leaders Isak and Muivah have taken Indian passports, a sign of their willingness to be Naga and Indian, and also of a new flexible approach.
Earlier this year, Hussain wrote that "New New Delhi was toying with the idea of a 'boundaryless' Naga superstructure where Naga representatives from around the northeast, including, of course, Nagaland, would run Naga affairs in the region related to their development and uplift." This suggests a solution wherein the Nagas would get maximum autonomy within the Indian constitution. There would be no redrawing of boundaries although a politico-administrative superstructure would be set up that would involve and provide for development of Nagas in Nagaland and beyond.
Just when it seems that a solution to the vexed Naga conflict could be within grasp, an organization called the Eastern Nagaland People's Organization (ENPO) has raised the demand for a separate "frontier state" comprising four districts in Nagaland - Mon, Tuensang, Kiphire and Longleng. The Chang, Konyak, Phom, Sangtam, Khiamniungan and Yimchunger communities in these four districts are complaining of isolation within Nagaland and are demanding statehood.
It is important that India includes representation of these districts and tribes to help calm rising separatist tensions here.
Khole is a Konyak from the Mon district. Both the NSCN-IM and the Indian government would be well-advised to reach out to his faction of the NSCN.
Khole has indicated that he is keen on reconciliation and talks. The split from Khaplang will allow him to engage in these.
New Delhi looks upon the split in the NSCN-K as a blow to the once formidable outfit. It is much more than that. The split has opened up space for a more inclusive peace process that could result in a more sustainable peace agreement.
The question is whether the Indian government and the NSCN-IM have the foresight to grab the opportunity that has opened up.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore. She can be reached at sudha98@hotmail.com